WILLIAMS vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC., et al.

Plaintiff alleges as follows:

1. As used in this Complaint, the word "Plaintiff" shall refer to Plaintiff DARRYL B WILLIAMS.

2. Plaintiff is a resident of Alameda County, California.

3. As used in this Complaint, the word "Defendants" shall refer to all Defendants named in this Complaint.

4. Defendant GENERAL MOTORS, LLC. ("Defendant GM") is a corporation organized and in existence under the laws of the State of Delaware and registered with the California Department of Corporations to conduct business in California. At all times relevant herein, Defendant was engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, constructing, assembling, marketing, distributing, and selling automobiles and other motor vehicles and motor vehicle components in Alameda County, California.

5. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Defendants sued under the fictitious names DOES 1 to 10. They are sued pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 474. When Plaintiff becomes aware of the true names and capacities of the Defendants sued as DOES 1 to 10, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to state their true names and capacities.

6. On or about June 21, 2017 , Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant GM regarding a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 , vehicle identification number 3GCUKREC0HG (hereafter "Vehicle"), which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant GM.

7. The warranty contract contained various warranties, including but not limited to the bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, emission warranty, etc. A true and correct copy of the warranty contract is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The terms of the express warranty are described in Exhibit A and are incorporated herein.

8. Pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the "Act") Civil Code sections 1790 et seq. the Subject Vehicle constitutes "consumer goods" used primarily for

family or household purposes, and Plaintiff has used the vehicle primarily for those purposes. Plaintiff is a "buyer" of consumer goods under the Act. Defendant GM is a "manufacturer" and/or "distributor" under the Act.

9. Plaintiff justifiably revokes acceptance of the Subject Vehicle under Civil Code, section 1794 , et seq. by filing this Complaint and/or did so prior to filing the instant Complaint.

10. These causes of action arise out of the warranty obligations of GM in connection with a motor vehicle for which GM issued a written warranty.

11. Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to, transmission defects, engine defects, electrical defects, among other defects and non-conformities.

12. Said defects/nonconformities substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the Vehicle.

13. The value of the Subject Vehicle is worthless and /or de minimis.

14. Under the Song-Beverly Act, Defendant GM had an affirmative duty to promptly offer to repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle at the time if failed to conform the Subject Vehicle to the terms of the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts.¹

15. Defendant GM has failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act.

16. Under the Act, Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of the price paid for the vehicle less that amount directly attributable to use by the Plaintiff prior to the first presentation to an authorized repair facility for a nonconformity.

1 "A manufacturer's duty to repurchase a vehicle does not depend on a consumer's request, but instead arises as soon as the manufacturer fails to comply with the warranty within a reasonable time. (Krotin V. Porsche Cars North America, Inc. ( 1995 ) 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 301-302, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 10.) Chrysler performed the bridge operation on Santana's vehicle in August 2014 with 30,262 miles on the odometer-within the three-year, 36,000 mile warranty. The internal e-mails demonstrating Chrysler's awareness of the safety risks inherent in the bridge operation were sent in September 2013 , and thus Chrysler was well aware of the problem when it performed the bridge operation on Santana's vehicle. Thus, Chrysler's duty to repurchase or provide restitution arose prior to the expiration of the three-year, 36,000 mile warranty. Moreover, although we do not have the actual five-year, 100,000 mile power train warranty in our record, Santana's expert testified that the no-start/stalling issues Santana experienced were within the scope of the power train warranty, which was still active when Santana requested repurchase in approximately January 2016 , at 44,467 miles. Thus the premise of Chrysler's argument-that Santana's request for repurchase was outside the relevant warranty-is not only irrelevant, but wrong." Santana V. FCA US, LLC, 56 Cal. App. 5th 334, 270 Cal. Rptr. 3d 335 ( 2020 ).